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THE SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT OF
I94O AND THE AMENDMENTS OF 1942
RoBERT H. SKiLTON t

Upon induction into the armed forces, the soldier or sailor leaves
behind him a civilian life of property relationships, most of which he
has not had time to solve. These property relationships had been of
deep concern to him; they involved the security that he was trying to
build up for himself and his family, the financial obligations he owed
his creditors, and his good reputation in the community. To preserve
them intact, continuing payments were required: rent, interest, principal, taxes, premiums. When he is inducted, in all probability his
income is reduced drastically; he can no longer preserve by his individual effort these property relatiorhips unimpaired. But if he is
forced to sacrifice his 1roperty and the security of his dependents, it
does not require much imagination to foresee that his morale will be
shaken and he will cease to be a useful member of the armed forces.
A solution is required, not only in fairness to the soldier or sailor
involved, but also as a matter of national necessity.
There are two possible solutions the government might offer to a
soldier's financial problems. The first solution is to increase his pay to
a point where he could meet his obligations. The second is to suspend
the enforcement of claims against him during the period of his service.
Although the soldiers' pay has been increased and an allotment
system introduced to provide subsistence for his dependents, the total
amount of income involved is hardly sufficient to take care of past
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obligations and pay insurance premiums, mortgage principal and interest; in fact, anything beyond bare subsistence." Under the terms of
the Selective Training and Service Act, private employers are per2
mitted to make supplementary payments to their former employees,
but the number of employers responding to the invitation would not
seem to be large.3 Because of the inadequacy of direct relief to soldiers
and sailors, moratory legislation suspending their accrued obligations
was virtually inevitable. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
of I94o-providing for a moratorium to be granted members of the
armed forces in the discretion of a court-was passed as an integral
part of the induction program.'
From the earliest periods of recorded history, moratoria have
been decreed by governments in unusual times. Natural catastrophes
-- drought, pestilence, and fire-wars, and, in recent times, the economic disturbances of business cycles, have all furnished occasions for
moratoria. Of all the causes for moratoria, war appears to be the
most frequent. There were moratoria in Europe during the Thirty
Years' War, the Napoleonic Wars, the War of 187o, and the First
World War." The experiences of this country with moratory legislation have also been considerable. State legislatures granted moratoria
for soldiers in the Civil War and the First World War.6 The late
depression (and indeed all previous major depressions) produced many
notable examples of governmentally imposed stays upon civil obligations, beginning with the Banking Holiday of 1933 and including a
x. Servicemen's Dependents Allowance Act of 1942: PuB. L. No. 625, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (June 23, 1942), as amended by Pun. L. No. 7o5, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug.
2o, 1942). In England, the allowance system appears to be more elastic. Provision

is made for additional allotments or temporary advances in cases deserving special
consideration. See Allowances for Dependents of Men Serving in His Majesty's
Forces (1940) 104 JIsT. P. 146.
2. Section 3 (f) of Selective Training and Service Act: "Nothing contained in this
or any other Act shall be construed as forbidding the payment of compensation by any
person, firm, or corporation to persons inducted into the land or naval forces of the

United States for training and service under this Act, or to members of the reserve
components of such forces now or hereafter on any type of active duty, who, prior to

their induction or commencement of active duty, were receiving compensation from
such person, firm, or corporation. . . ." 54 SiTA. 885 (1940), So U. S. C. A. 88
(Supp. 1941). Where employers adopt such a policy, care should be taken in framing their statements so that they may not be construed as an offer, capable of acceptance and resulting in a binding contracL See Serving Soldiers and their Civil Fa'i
(194o) 104 JUST. P. 427.
3 7 LAB. Rx.. REP. 2or; 02 (1 940).
4. 54 SrTA. 1178 (1940), 50 U. S. C. A. app. §§o-585 (Supp. 1941). It was

introduced while hearings were taking place on the Selective Service Act, and hearings
were held on it in that connection. It was the War Department's response to the proposed Overton Amendment.
Act (1940) 491 et seq.

See House Hearings on Selective Service and Training
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variety of moratoria on mortgage foreclosures.' It is, therefore, by no
means uncharacteristic of our nation that the present response to the
problems of inducted men should be provision for a moratorium.
The purpose of the device is to preserve an existing social pattern
during a period which is believed to be unusual and temporary in
character. A moratorium is effective if the period of the emergency
is short, and the subsequent time is sufficiently prosperous in comparison with the time preceding the emergency to enable the parties protected to repay the suspended obligations. Where, however, the period
of the emergency proves to be long (as was the case in the depression
of 1929-1939) the tendency will be to renew the moratorium and to
postpone the final solution to the debtor's problems. In the meantime,
unless interest is currently paid in full, the obligations will increase,
and the chances of an eventual successful outcome from the debtor's
viewpoint will diminish steadily. And if the subsequent economic rise
does not reach the level of that existing previous to the emergency, the
value of the assets protected probably will not then be sufficient to repay
the obligations involved. Only a few drastic solutions remain available:
bankruptcy for the debtors involved, more painful because protracted,
or governmental intervention in a huge refinancing or subsidy program
which will not add to the real wealth of the country as a whole.
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the moratorium may
serve a valuable purpose, though temporary, if it is necessary to the
country to postpone wholesale and immediate liquidation. The necessities of the case, from the standpoint of morale, would seem to justify a moratorium to soldiers even though it is no final solution to a
problem.
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 194o was virtually
a reenactment of the earlier Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
1918.8 This earlier Act was adopted in the late stages of the nation's
effort in the First World War. At the time it was passed there were
already in existence in many of the states moratory laws attempting
to protect soldiers and sailors." These Acts, as were their predecessors
of the Civil War, were absolute in character-they closed the courts to
creditors of the inductee for the duration of his service. This type of
legislation seemed unfair, since there were many cases where the staying of a suit against a soldier could result in little good to him and
great hardship to the creditor. On the other hand, the practice of
viewing a moratorium as a matter for the exercise of judicial discre7. State Measures for the Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness in the United States,

1933 and 5934, compiled by Olcott and Berlow, U. S. Dept. of Agric., Bur. of Agric.

Ec. Bibliography No. 53& 4o STAT. 44o (ix8), So U. S. C. A. 65 (Supp.
9. See note 6 .spra. -

194t).

1So

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

tion had been adopted in Europe.10 This latter approach was chosen.
Two polar considerations motivated the draftsmen: (i) to protect the
soldiers wherever protection would be of real benefit to him; (2) to
give the creditor of the soldier as much protection as possible under
the circumstances. The solution was to throw the entire matter upon
the courts, by giving them discretion to decide upon the grant of
moratoria in individual cases, subject to certain guides defined in the
statute.1" This type of moratorium necessitated a review of each case
upon its merits. It had both the advantages and disadvantages of
elasticity.
Briefly, the 194o Act limited the right of a creditor to the help of
the court and to self-help in certain cases. A creditor was forbidden
to obtain judgment for want of appearance against a member of the
armed forces.12 Appearance having been entered on behalf of the
inductee, the creditor could obtain trial and judgment only in cases
where the court was satisfied that the soldier's defense (if any existed)
would not be impaired by his absence from court 1 If the creditor
succeeded in obtaining judgment by court consent, he could nevertheless be prevented from obtaining execution on the judgment, in the discretion of the court, unless the court found that the soldier's ability to
14
pay was not impaired by his presence in the armed forces.
In its provisions for judicial process, the 194o Act attempted to
find a delicate balance between conflicting claims of soldier and creditor
to social protection. It permitted the creditor to proceed with his case
as far as it was possible to go without impairment of a soldier's legitimate interest as determined in each case. If the creditor could not
have execution, at least he could be permitted to obtain judgment and
place himself in a strategic position for action at the end of the moratorium. Soldiers whose cases did not appear to the court to be meritorious did not obtain protection. The court had complete power to
order any disposition of the case, including execution, which would
seem to fit the best interests of both parties concerned.
io. See note s supra.
zz. See Ferry, Rosenbaum and Wigmore, The History of the Soldieri and SailOre Civil Relief Act (igp8) 3 MASS. L Q. 204.
12. 54 STAT. 118o (1940), so U. S. C. A. app. J s" (Supp. z94z).
13. Ibid. For illustrative cases recently decided, see Swiderski v. Moodenbaugh,
44 F. Supp. 687 (D. C. Ore. 1942) (trial ordered in automobile accident case where
defendant soldier was insured, depositions taken, and plaintiff had agreed to limit his
claim to amount of insurance) ; Charles Tolmas, Inc. v. Streiffer, 5 So. (2d) 372 (La.
1941) (stay set aside where lease sued upon revealed no ambiguities which r:ould call
for soldier's testimony and breach was clear) ; Korsch v. Lambing, 28 N. Y. S. (2d)
167 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (stay ordered where defendant was a necessary witness and was
stationed in another state).
z4. Note z2 supra. Illustrative cases recently decided are Cortland Say. Bank v.
Ivory, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 313 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (described in text infra) ; The Sylph, 42
F. Supp. 354 (E. D. N. Y. 1941) (execution allowed where chattel involved vm depreciating, on condition that plaintiff waive personal claim against defendant).
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In certain cases, restrictions were also placed upon the creditor's
rights to action out of court. The landlord's right to eviction and distress, the mortgagee's right to exercise his power of sale, the conditional vendor's right to retake possession of the property, were powers
that could not validly be used against a soldier without court approval.
In its policy and purpose, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act of 194o received wide approval. But it was not beyond reproach
and criticism in its precise treatment of many particular problems.
Possibly much of the criticism arose from changed circumstances. At
the time it was passed, it seemed adequate to meet the needs of men
who were expected (by some Congressmen, at least) to remain in the
services for one year of peaceful training. The actualities of war have
destroyed these pleasant illusions. The army must be held intact, and
it must grow. More married men, and older men, whose financial
problems demand a broad and comprehensive program of moratory
relief, are being inducted. The conflict may be protracted; it became
obvious that the short period originally provided for payment by the
soldier of his obligations upon his return from service, would not be
enough. In addition, there were ambiguities in the Act which required
correction.
The developing criticism of the original Act was evidenced by the
fact that in the last two years, many bills were introduced into Congress. 15 Some of these measures were sponsored by governmental
departments, and represented their considered judgment as to particular matters requiring revision; others were sponsored by individual
members or public groups. A few bills managed to pass one house;
but with a single exception, none resulted in the amendment of the
original act.
The reason for the failure of any amending bill to pass both
fouses appears to have been the decision of a subcommittee of the
House Committee on Military Affairs to incorporate all acceptable proposals into a single amending act. With this in view, H. R. 7029 was
introduced into the House by Representative Sparkman.16 Hearings
were held,"7 and as a result, the bill was redrafted and reintroduced
x1.S. z372, introduced November io, ig4i (House Bill 4546), providing for
changes in insurance prov-isions; S. x569, introduced May 26, 1941 (House Bill 4936),
providing for termination of leases; H. R. 5233, introduced July 3, i941, providing for
stay of foreclosures of storage liens and government guarantee; H. R. 461o, introduced
May 2, 1941, providing for limitation on interest rates to 6 per cent.; H. R. 4686, introduced May 8, 1941, providing for relief from personal property taxes; H. R. 4930,
introduced June 2, 194z, extending the protection of Section 3o2 (z) to obligations
originating prior to termination of Selective Training and Service Act.
z6. Introduced April 30, z942.
z7. May 22 and 2S, 1942.
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as H. R. 7164.18 This bill, entitled the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act Amendments of 1942, was passed by the House on June
i8, 1942; amended by the Senate, and passed on July 30, 1942. A
joint committee, appointed to iron out matters in dispute and find a
mutually acceptable Act, reported on September 24, 1942. Its report
was accepted by both Houses, and the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act Amendments of 1942 became law by Presidential signature
on October 6, 1942.1t
The coverage of these Amendments is extensive. The Act is
about as long as the original Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
194o, and does much to clarify and strengthen it. Briefly, the Act
includes within its protection accommodation co-makers, 20 persons serving in the armed forces of our allies, and sureties on criminal bonds. 21
It provides that the Secretaries of War and Navy shall give notice of
the benefits of the Act to men in service. It limits the amount of
interest that may accrue during the period of service to 6 per cent.,
unless the soldier's ability to pay is not affected. It grants relief to
landlords against mortgages, taxes and conditional sales, where relief
has been granted against them. Mortgages and contracts for the sale
of real and personal property are protected if executed before entry
into service. The lessee is given a statutory right to terminate his
lease when called into military service. Life insurance policies assigned
as collateral may be protected by the soldier. Extra-judicial enforcement of storage liens is forbidden. A soldier's dependents are given
the benefits of Article III (relief against rent, mortgages, and conditional sales). There are provisions for "FURTHER RELIEF", entitling
the soldier to ask a court to reamortize contracts, by extending the
period of the life of the contract by the period of service, and spreading the accrued payments equally over the extended period. Modifications are also made in the insurance protection provisions of the original Act.
The appearance of these Amendments furnishes a proper time for
a short review of some of the problems raised by the original act and
the solutions adopted by-the. 1942 version. The approach that will be
taken will be to consider ihe scope of the 194o Act with regard to certain important properiy riglits, and'ilien to consider the Amendments
and their adequacy to meet the problems involved.
18. Introduced June x, x942.
xg. PUB. LAW No. 732, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct: 6;.I 9).
2o. This seemed to be necessary because of the decisiori of judge Pecora in In re
Itzkowitz, 3o N. Y. S. (2d) 336 (Sup. Cf .xg4i). HoW.ve'r, that decision has been
contradicted by Modern Industrial Bk. v. Zaentz et a[., i N. Y. S. (2d) 969 (Mn.
Ct. 1941)..
21. See Note (xg4i) z3o A. L. R. 779.
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Leases
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 194o provided:
"No eviction or distress shall be made during the period of
military service in respect of any premises for which the agreed
rent does not exceed $8oper month occupied chiefly for dwelling
purposes by the wife, child, or other dependents of a person in
military service, except upon leave of court granted upon application therefore or granted in an action or proceeding affecting the
. On any such application or in any
right of possession..
such action the court may, in its discretion, on its own motion, and
shall, on application, unless in the bpinion of the court the ability
of the tenant to pay the agreed rent is not materially affected by
reason of such military service, stay the proceedings for not longer
in this act or it may make such
than three months, as provided
2
other order as may be just."
Criminal penalties were attached to violation of these provisions.2 3 To
some extent the landlord was compensated by provision that the Secretaries of Wyar, Navy, or Treasury, as the case may be, may order an
allotment of the pay of the person in military service to discharge the
rent.2 4 Compensation, however, could hardly be sufficient to discharge
rent in the case of premises renting for $8o a month, occupied by the
dependents of a soldier inducted as a private.
Except for the fact that the maximum rental for protected leases
was changed from $So to $8o a month, the provision of the 194o Act
was the same as that of the 1918 Act. The change was made because
it was believed that the avetage level of rent had risen.2 5 The figure
actually fixed was not determined by statistical method; it was selected
arbitrarily. Leases on business properties (regardless of the amount
of rental) and leases on residential properties above $80 a month, were
excluded from the protection.
The 194o provision was vague. Furthermore, it did not discriminate between cases. The landlord had to go into court for permission to evict the dependents of a soldier, regardless of the length of
time during which he permitted them to remain in default. It is one
thing to require a landlord to obtain court permission for eviction during the first month of default; it is another to ask him to obtain court
permission for eviction after he has exercised forbearance and allowed
the dependents to remain in default for a considerably longer period.
The court was empowered to grant at least three months' delay before
22. Section 3oo (i) and(2), 54 STAT. 1i81 (1940), so U. S. C. A.app. §53o (Supp.

1941).

Section 300 (3), 54 STAT. xt8 (194o), o U. S. C. A. app. § 530 (Supp. 941.
Section 300 (4), 54 STAT. II81 (194o), So U.S.C. A. app. § 530 (Supp. 194).
2,5. See note 4 supra.
23.
24.
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eviction, again regardless of the length of period of default. Even
more important, however, is the fact that it was by no means clear for
how long a court may order a stay of eviction. The phrase "for not
longer than three months", taken by itself, was quite clear; but it was
followed by the additional phrase "or it may make such other order as
may be just". Did this additional language give a court the alternative
of granting a three months' order or of granting an order for a longer
period of time? In two cases decided under the 1918 Act, the courts
of different states took contrary views. 26 In a recent New York lower
court decision, the court granted a continuance of a three months' stay
upon payment by the dependent of one month's back rent, although the
tenant remained in default for other months.2 T
This lack of clarity was called to the attention of the House Committee on Military Affairs, in considering the proposed 1942 Amendment. 20 Unfortunately, however, no action was taken to clarify the
language of the Act. It is well to give a court discretion in handling
matters of this kind; but if boundaries to that discretion are intended,
they should be stated clearly, and not ambiguously.
That it may have been the intention of the House Committee to
confer upon the courts power to grant stay of eviction for periods of
time longer than three months, is indicated by the fact that the Amendments include a new provision, giving a landlord adversely affected by
a moratorium power to ask the court for relief against tax, conditional
sale, and mortgage claims. 29 Here we have an instance of the relief
of creditors: an attempt to distribute the financial burdens of a moratorium. Obviously the solution is not a perfect one. It is illogical to
make provision for the relief of one particular class of creditors at the
expense of another class. Why should the relief granted stop with the
landlord? Why should not relief be granted to the landlord's mortgagee as well?
The provision illustrates the tendency of one moratorium to lead
to another. If one class of debtors is excused from payment, demands
are made for relief by their creditors, and so on, until the eventual
outcome may be a general moratorium. n the last depression, a banking holiday moratorium led in many states to insurance, and mortgage
moratoria. In Great Britain the benefits of a judicial stay of proceedings are available to all persons adversely affected by war, and not
26. Riordan v. Zube, 5o Cal. App. 22, i9 Pac. 65 (192o) ; Gilluly v. Hawkins, 107
Wash. 79, 182 Pac. 958 (xgg).
27. Jonda Realty Corp. v. Marabotto, 34 N. Y. S. (2d) 30r (Mun. Ct. 1942).
28. Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 7o29, 77th Cong., 2d

Sess. (19V) IS.
29. PUB. LAW No. 732, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 6, r942) J &
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merely to soldiers.3 0 The increasing impact of the tax burden upon
many people in this country has caused Mr. J. Randolph Paul to suggest
the possibility of a general moratorium available to all classes.
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 194o contained no
reference to the right of a lessee to terminate his lease upon induction
into the armed forces. That this right existed, however, as a principle of
common law independent of statute, was indicated by a lower court New
2
York case decided in 1920,81 and another decided recently.3 In both
of these cases the lessee occupied premises for business purposes and
upon being drafted into the armed forces abandoned the premises. In
the first case, the lessee himself was sued upon his return from service.
In the second case, the guarantor of the lessee was sued immediately.
In both cases, the defendants were held to be relieved of liability on
the ground that the induction of the lessee into the Army amounted to
a frustration of the purpose of the lease and created a discharge.
These decisions raise more questions than they answer. How far
does this asserted application of the doctrine of impossibility of performance extend? Does it excuse a lessee for business purposes who
can, upon his induction, obtain a manager to carry on the business for
him? Does it excuse a lessee of a long-term lease, who may be held to
have foreseen the contingencies of war? Does it excuse a lessee of a
dwelling whose dependents can still use the premises if they so desire?
Does it excuse a lessee* who signed as head of a large business which
was the real occupant of the premises? To attempt to answer these
questions would be to deparit from decided cases into speculation.
The matter was obviously one for statutory definition. Under the
sponsorship of the War Department, a Bill had been introduced into
the Senate 33 which provided that an inductee would be entitled to terminate his lease by written notice delivered to the lessor at any time
following the date of his military service: the termination to be
effective after thirty days from the date of the next monthly rental
payment. This Bill purported to confer upon the lessee an absolute
right to terminate any lease covering premises occupied. for dwelling,
professional, business, agricultural, or similar purposes.
30. See Rogers, The Courts (Emergcncy Powers) Acts r939 and 194o-A Revwzu in Retrospect (194o) 5 CONVEYANCE AND REAL PROPERTY LAwYER 4. The English Liabilities (War-time Adjustment) Act of x94! provides a further step toward
solving the problems of debtors distressed by war. This' statute provides a mode of
reorganization of debtor's business with the object of enabling him to discharge his
debts and possibly keep some of his property and his business. For a discussion of the
Act, see Rogers, The Liabilitfes-11'ar-time Adjustment Act of 1940 (1941) 6 CONVEYANCE AND REAL PROPERTY LAWYER 31.
31. State Realty Co. v. Greenfield, 11o Misc. 27o, 181 N. Y. Supp. 511 (1920).
32. Jefferson Estates, Inc. v. Jacob Wilson, Mun. Ct. of City of N. Y., Bor. of
Man., 3d Dist, decided May 28, 1942.
33. S. 1569, cited note i5 supra.
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The Bill, after passage by the Senate,3 4 was incorporated into
H. R. 7029 and eventually into H. R. 7164. Objections were made at
the hearing on H. R. 7029,3 5 by a member of the subcommittee, that

the Bill was too broad in scope-that it allowed termination in cases
where the lessee's ability to use the premises and continue payments
was not affected by his presence in the armed forces. In consequence,
the proviso was added to H. R. 7164 that "upon application by.the
lessor to the appropriate court prior to the termination period provided
for in the notice, any relief granted in this subsection shall be subject
to such modifications or restrictions as in the opinion of the court justice and equity may in the circumstances require". s
This additional provision is so broad as to suggest that the entire
section now is virtually meaningless. Termination by the lessee is not
made a matter of right in any case: it is subject to court review. The
principles which will govern the court in determining the equities of the
case may still be the principles which governed courts in determining
the right to a discharge on the ground of impossibility where no
statute existed. If the section is to have a real meaning, it would seem
advisable to place limits upon the court's power of review by describing
certain exceptional cases where the lessor would be permitted to apply
to the court for review.
Real Estate Mortgages
The 194o Act dealt specifically with the problem of mortgages
against real and personal property owned by men in the armed forces.3 t
The court was empowered to stay foreclosure proceedings for the duration of service and three months thereafter, in cases of default in the
payment of sums accruing before service, or during seryice. Sales out
of court were forbidden. The broad discretion conferred upon the
court enabled it to postpone foreclosure .for any length of time.up to
the maximum; to order current payment of interest as a condition to
postponement; or to decree immediate foreclosure when the equities
seemed to require it. An example of the purely discretionary character of the judicial
action provided is the case of Cortland Say. Bank v. Izory.38 An FHA
mortgage was involved: created in 1936, and calling for payments of
principal, interest, taxes, etc., of $44.33 a month. Payments were
34. July r4, 1941.

35. Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs on H. R.
Sess. (1942)

7029, 77th Cong., 2d

26.

36. See PuB. LAW No. 732, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 6, 1942) § z2.
37. Section 302, 54 STAT. 1182 (1940), 50 U. S. C. A. app. § 532 (Supp. 194t).
38. 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 313 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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regularly made until the mortgagor's entry into the armed forces.
His income, which was $203.8o a month before his induction, was
reduced to $154 a month for some months thereafter and then raised
to $177.3o a month. The court ordered payment of $26.95 a month
for interest and taxes as a condition of stay.
It became clear that the mortgage provisions of the 194o Act
required amendment in certain respects. For example, all accrued
indebtedness had to be paid, according to the terms of the Act, within
three months after the mortgagor left service. This provision seemed
proper at a time when a one year period of induction was contemplated.
But it hardly afforded adequate relief when the period of service is
protracted and the indebtedness grows in the meantime. As an act of
grace, rather than compulsion, the FHA permitted mortgagees, insured
under the terms of the National Housing Act, before instituting foreclosure proceedings, to allow a returning soldier one year in which
to cure his default.3 9 The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
Amendments of 1942 provide a way for extending the time within
which the default must be made good: in effect, reamortization is
required; the mortgage must be recast by extending it by the length of
40
the period of service.
The protection of this section is further extended. The prior
limitation to mortgages created up to October 17, 194o, has been
stricken out, and relief provided in the case of any mortgage created
before entry into service. 41 Some mortgagees may think this bad manners on the part of Congress: for the purpose of the limitation in the
original act (and of a similar limitation on protected contracts of conditional sale) appears to have been to prevent the freezing of credit.
The credit having been given, the moratorium is extended. But from
the soldiers' viewpoint, the amendment seems just and necessary.
Another change prolongs periods of redemption after foreclosure by
the length of the service.4 2 Failure to include such provision in the
original act was apparently an error in draftsmanship rather than a
matter of policy.
The repercussion of the relief granted upon mortgagee's rights
will grow as the number of inducted men increases. The time may
come when it will seem necessary to relieve mortgagees from many of
their own obligations, in cases where relief is granted against them.
The mortgagee's hardship is increased by the fact that he is not assured
of eventual repayment of the accrued indebtedness, except where he is
39. See Regulations printed 14 C. C. I-. War Law Serv. f"19ji.
40. PuB. I.Aw No. 732, 77th Cong., 2d Scss. (Oct 6, 1942) § i8.
41. Id. §9.
42. Id. § xo.
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insured by the Federal Housing Administration. What reasonable
distinction can be made between the cases of policies held by insurance
companies, where the premium is guaranteed by the Federal Government, and the cases of mortgages held by insurance companies or other
savings institutions and individual mortgagees, where the Federal
Government requires the entire risk to be borne by the private creditor? What reasonable distinction can be made between lessors and
mortgagees, that one should be allowed to obtain relief and the other
not, under the Amendments? It seems to be a case where expediency
rather than logic has governed.
ConditionalSales and Mortgages of PersonalProperty
Change in events has likewise called for reconsideration of the
special provisions in the I94O Act dealing with conditional sales and
mortgages of personal property. By Section 301 it was provided that
no person who sold conditionally real or personal property and received
a deposit on account should resume possession of property by extrajudicial action for non-payment of installments falling due during the
period of the vendee's military service, except where a later agreement
in writing was entered into with the vendee. At a hearing the court
was empowered to order a stay of proceedings if in its opinion defendant's ability to comply was materially affected by reason of service and
it was to the best interests of the defendant so to do.4 ' Section 303
limited the court's power by providing that it is not entitled to stay
proceedings to resume possession of a motor vehicle or tractor unless
the court found that 50 per cent. or more of the purchase price was
paid. As a condition to an order of sale, the court could require the
entry by the plaintiff of a bond to indemnify the defendant against
44
damage.
Such provisions allowing a moratorium with respect to personal
property under a conditional sales agreement (as well as those governing chattel mortgages) have been outmoded. In most cases today it
would no longer be to the best interests of the defendant to grant a
stay of proceedings, where deteriorating chattels (except furniture)
were involved. For example,.in the case of Associates Discount Corporation v. Armstrong,45 the. defendant had purchased an automobile
in June, 194o, by paying part of the purchase.price and agreeing to pay
the balance in monthly installments. He continued his payments until
his induction into the army in February, i 9 4 1. No further payments
43. 54 STAT. 1181 (I.4o), o U. S. C. A. app. § 53z (Supp. ig.I).
44. 54 STAT. 1183 (940),.5o U. S. C. A. app. § 533 (Supp. 1941).
45. 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 36 (City Ct. 1942).
•
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were made until his release from the army in October, 1941; thereafter he made two additional payments. In January, 1942, he was reinducted, and the plaintiff brought an action of replevin. The defendant
invoked the protection of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.
The court refused a stay of proceeding, and ordered that the defendant
should be paid the difference between the value of the car and the balance due. It was said:
"A stay of proceedings herein will work an unnecessary,
unexpected, and unjustifiable hardship on plaintiff without bringing any benefit to defendant. The term of his present service is
indefinite. -Inthe meantime, the automobile is in storage, the
expense of which is increasing daily'; the car is depreciating in
value and the future holds only uncertainty as to the possibility
of obtaining materials necessary for repairs or replacements to
the car if it should be put to use again. It seems, therefore, that
the rights of the parties should be determined in accordance with
Section 310, subdivision 3--'or it [the court] may make such
other disposition of the case as may be equitable to conserve the
interests of all parties'." 46
The example set by the New York Court in dealing with a conditional sales contract has received the approval of .the Amendments of
1942. Section 3o3 is thereby repealed. Article III of the i94o Act is
amended by four new sections, 47 giving the court power to appoint
three disinterested parties to appraise personal property which is the
subject of a conditional sale or chattel mortgage, and in accordance
with such appraisal to aWard the difference between the debt due and
the appraised value of the property to the person in military service or
his dependents. By the terms of these provisions, stay is still possible;
but the court is thus encouraged to order the surrender of the chattel.
In the words of Major Partlow:
"The object of this section is to allow foreclosure or repossession on an equitable basis in those cases where no hardship wil
result to the dependents of those persons involved in military service, thereby eliminating to some extent the objectionable deprivation of the use of the property which is the subject of the stay
under the Act.
"Although courts now have authority to accomplish the purpose of this act, nevertheless, this provision will serve as a guide,
and has been suggested by financial interests." 48
46. Id. at 38.

47. PuB. LAw No. 732, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 6, i942) §§ iI, z2.
48. Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 7o29, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (7942) 19.
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Insuranwe
By the terms of Article IV of tile 194o Act, a member of the
armed forces was entitled to secure the protection of life insurance
policies owned by him, up to a total face value of $5,000. This protection was in addition to the privilege given the soldier to obtain
$io,ooo worth of National Service Life Insurance. The Federal Government, acting as guarantor, undertook to reimburse the insurance
company involved for premiums not paid by the soldier during the
period of protection.
Not all insurance policies owned by the inductee could thus receive
protection. The inductee would not be fully protected if he had any
more than $5,ooo face value in insurance policies. The act did not
protect life insurance policies where there was an outstanding loan
in excess of So% of the cash surrender value, nor policies whose premiums had been due and unpaid for more than one year. In additi6n, the Veterans' Administration ruled that policies with war risk
clauses and group insurance policies were not included in the protection of the Act.49 Oddly enough, however, term insurance-with no
cash surrender value at all-could be protected.
The act was also incomplete in certain other respects. Policies
assigned by the insured as collateral were not protected. If the insured
failed to cure the default on a protected policy within one year after
leaving service, the policy was to be surrendered-unless the insured
prior thereto had effected a settlement.
To correct certain features of the insurance provisions of the
194o Act, the Veterans' Administration, charged with the administration of the provisions, sponsored a bill which eventually passed the
Senate, as S. 1372. The bill was sidetracked in the House, and another
provision was incorporated into H. R. 7164. Both bills provided for
a simplified system of administration which relieved the Veterans'
Administration of much clerical work. H. R. 7164, however, was
much more liberal to the inductee. The differences between the provisions of S. 1372 and H. R. 7164 may be briefly summarized:
(I) H. R. 7164 raised the amount of protected insurance to $io,oooS. 1372 retained the $5,ooo limit.

(2) H. R. 7.164. included term
insurance and fraternal society policies within it. .enefits; S. 1372

excluded them. (3) Both acts eliminated the provision that protection should not be extended in cases where there was an outstanding
loan equal to or greater than 50o of the cash surrender value; but
S. 1372 substituted the provision that the policy should have been
in force at least one year and 6iat a reserve equal to one year's pre49. Regulations printed I C. C. It. War Law Serv.

19.114 et seq.
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mium should be vested in the policy a year after the time when the
policy came under the coverage of the act. In effect, this would have
made it necessary for a policy to be in force for three or four years
before it could qualify. H. R. 7164 simply required that the policy be
in force on the date of the act or for thirty days before entry into service. (4) S. 1372 continued the requirement of the original act that the
default must be made good within one year after service; but, where
no settlement had been made by the soldier in that time, permitted a
running on of the policy in the form of extended insurance, rather
than surrender of the policy, if the government was relieved of liability.
H. R. 7164 extended the period within which the soldier must make
good his default to three years after leaving service, provided one-third
of the default was paid successively at the end of the first and second
years. (5) H. R. 7164 limited the interest chargeable during the moratorium to 4 per cent.; S. 1372 allowed the insured to change the policy rate. (6) S. 1372 provided that any premiums paid by the United
States would become a claim against the soldier; H. R. 7164 did not.
When H. R. 7164 was submitted to the consideration of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, that committee was chagrined at
the fact that S. 1372 had been tampered with. Their opposition to the
changes introduced in the insurance provisions by this bill was doubtless encouraged by the fact that the Veterans' Administration was on
record against the proposal to increase the coverage to $ro,OOO and
various other proposals of H. R. 7164. The Senate Committee struck
out the insurance provisions of the House bill and substituted S. 1372
as the insurance section. In this form H. R. 7164 passed the Senate.50
The House sponsors of the bill, however, regarded the changes as
radical in character, 51 and the dispute over the insurance provisions
delayed agreement upon the precise language of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942 for some time. Finally, on
September 24, the managers appointed by House and Senate reported
52
agreement
The agreement favored the House. version for the most part. The
protection was placed at $I.oooo; term policies and fraternal benefits
were included; the policy need be in force only thirty days or before
the act to qualify. The insured was given two years, instead of one
or three, within which to settle his accrued premiums upon his return
from service. The insurer was allowed to charge the policy interest
rates. Premiums paid by the United States Government became a personal claim against the insured. This agreement having been reached,
5O. July 30, 1942.
5i. 77 CoxG. REC., Aug. 31, 1942, at 7240.
52. See PuB. LAw No. 732, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 6, 1942)

z13.
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the way was clear for swift approval of the report of the joint committee. This took place in the Senate on September 24, and in the
House on September 28, and the Act was ready for Presidential
signature.
Readjustment Problems
The most important provisions of the Amendments of 1942, however, excited little controversy: These have to do with the problem of
readjusting the soldier to civilian life upon the termination of his service. Section 18 of the Amendments adds a new article to the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, which entitles the man in service to petition a court, while in service or within sx months after his return, for a
rewriting of his obligations. In the case of a contract for the purchase
of real estate, or a mortgage on real estate, the court is empowered to
stay enforcement of the obligation and reamortize payments accruing
by extending the obligation's remaining life by the length of service
involved. In the case of all other obligations, the stay may be extended
for a period of time equal to the period of service, and the accrued
debt amortized over that time.
From the soldier's viewpoint, this section seems to be much more
realistic than its predecessor, which required insurance premiums to be
made good in one year, taxes in six months, and all other obligations
in three months. But the new provision is, of course, merely an extension of the moratory principle, and merely grants a more realistic deferment of the problems of the soldier. It does not solve them. 53
Since the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act and its Amendments are thus purely moratory in character, they merely furnish a
breathing space in which the nation can develop a coordinated plan for
solving the problems of the returning soldier.
The reemployment provisions of the Selective Service Act, in this
regard, are useful, but of course they cannot be an entire solution to.
the problem.5 4 The employer is under no duty to re-hire his returning
53. Unfortunately, this provision adds an incongruity to the Act which apparently
came in by accident. As originally introduced in H. R. 7029, the provision required
application for relief by the soldier within three months after leaving service. This
time limit was in keeping with other sections, forbidding creditors to exercise selfhelp until.three months after service, and requiring them to go into court. That section was entitled "General Relief After Period of Service" and contemplated application within the three months' time after discharge. At the suggestion of Mr. Monsman, however, the soldier was accorded a right to apply for relief during service as
well as after, and the three months' additional period was changed to six months, to
give the soldier more time. But the draftsmen neglected to defer the right of creditors
to self-help for the additional three months' period. A lamentable confusion has been
introduced.
54. First appearing in National Guard Act, Section 3 of S. J. Res. 286, signed by
the President, Aug. 28, z94o. This is Section 8 of the Selective Service Act, 54 STAT.
89o (ig4o), 5o U. S. C. A. app. § 3o8 (Supp. x94!). The reinstatement provisions appear to have been suggested by the English prototype. The National Service (Armed
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ex-employee if the soldier is not physically capable of performing his
former functions, or if the employee was merely a temporary employee,
or if it would be "unreasonable" to require the employer to re-hire him
in view of changed economic conditions. In any event, the difficulty
of any legal compulsion upon the employer is evident.
If, however, jobs are not readily available, we may expect demands
from returning soldiers for payments to meet obligations that have been
deferred under the moratorium, and to get started in a new enterprise.
The nation should lay some plans for this eventuality. A system of
compulsory savings, by the purchase of war bonds, even though it
involved raising the soldier's pay to accomplish this, might be a better
plan than a bonus. A program for vocational education of disabled
soldiers to fit them for new civilian jobs should be undertaken immediately. Present planning of a coordinated program covering all problems
of the returning soldier is urgent.
Forces) Act, 2939, 2 & 3 GEo. VI, c. 81, § 14; The Reserve and Auxiliary Forces Act,
1939, 2 & 3 Gri. VI, c. 24, § 2. In England, regulations have been issued to prevent
the evasion of reinstatement provisions by dismissal of employees before entry into
service. 3 BUTITFRWORTH, EIraGENCy LEGISLATIO., No. 35, at p. 74 (i94o). Private
employment acts have been passed by some states to reinforce federal provisions. Ill.
Laws 1941, p. 1202, ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1942) C. 1263/, §§ 29-35;
Mont. Laws 1941, e.-150; Nev. Laws 1941, p. 37; N. Y. Laws i94, p. 1552, N. Y.
CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, Supp. 1941) art. 13, §316; Okla. Laws 194!, p. 438, OK-..
STAT. ANN. (Harlowe, 1942) § z2o8b; Wash. Laws 1941, p. 592, WASn. Rzv. STAT.
ANN. (Remington, Supp. 294!) §§ 10758-3 to o758-9.
Certain state acts require reemployment of inducted state and local employees
under certain conditions: ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1941) tit. S&C. 9, § 361;
I1. Laws 194!, p. 402, IL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1942) c. 242, §§ 150-153;
10 MASS. AN N. LAWS (Supp. 1941) p. 38; Okla. Laws 1942, p. 438; Ox.. STAT.
ANN. (Harlowe, 1942) § 12018a; Ore. Laws 1942, p. 5o8, 7 OR. Co.tp. LAWS ANwi.
(Supp. 2941) § 104-7ao4; Pa. Laws 1941, p. 744, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 194z)
tit. 24, § 2731.3; Wis. Laws 194!, c. 102, 171.
Reinstatement after war service has also been made the subject of collective bargaining agreements in many cases. Some clauses adopted merely repeat the statutory
language; in other cases, however, additional clauses are added, protecting temporary
employees, or returned service men who are not physically acceptable within the period
set for application but who become well thereafter. For typical clauses, see 9 LAS.
R.. R'. 86, 89 (2942); 9 LAu. R.. REP. 10, 131 (1941); 9 LAu. REL. Rm', 397,
399 (294); io LAB. R.. REP. 77, 8o (1942) ; io LAn. RL.. REP. 311, 312 (2942).

